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Abstract 
Information security goals and services for e-contracting systems have not previously been 
closely examined in open literature. This paper identifies key security goals and the services 
to be considered when designing e-contracting systems. Several AEC collaborative platforms 
are reviewed. These systems are currently used for project management and could be used for 
e-contracting. The results of the review show that while integrity and confidentiality of 
contract documents is ensured during communication in contract formation, few of the 
systems consider these security requirements during archiving. A new e-contracting 
architecture is proposed to provide security for the full e-contract life cycle. 
 
1. Introduction 
Modern Architecture, Engineering and Construction (AEC) enterprises conduct 
business under a contract which constitutes a legally binding agreement enforced by the 
law between the enterprise and its customers or suppliers [20]. The automation of the 
contracting process, especially with the advent of the Internet in the past decade, has 
benefited these enterprises in improved productivity and security, effective aggregated 
contract information, speed-up of the contract life-cycle process, reduction in 
contractual errors and risk, profit optimization and better compliance [22].  
A typical e-contracting system is a web-based software application used to conduct 
contracting between business parties where the e-contracting system works as a 
representation of paper contracts. Online collaborative platforms such as Aconex [4], 
Constructware [10], Causeway [11], are emerging as the principal systems for 
document management in the AEC sector. Such systems could potentially be used for e-
contracting. However, there are currently no specific tools designed for e-contracting. 
The increasing use of the Internet as an effective business tool for e-contracting has 
motivated us to investigate the information security consequences that may flow from 
using the Internet as a medium to form contractual relationships. This paper identifies 
the security requirements and services of e-contracting systems.  
In a closely related work, Knorr and Röhrig [21] have presented an open framework 
for the analysis of security requirements of business processes in electronic commerce. 
They have identified confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability as the 
security objectives to suit the legal needs of a business process. Meier and Röhrig [23] 
have used a goal-oriented approach to derive appropriate security safeguards for the 
different contract types and discuss the implementation issues for electronic agent-
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based contracting systems. Both Knorr and Röhrig and Meier and Röhrig concentrate on 
contract formation. In this paper we consider security during contract formation, 
management and archiving. 
This paper contributes by identifying the information security requirements that e-
contracting systems must achieve. In addition, the paper presents results of an informal 
survey of several AEC collaborative platforms that could be used for e-contracting. 
Finally, the paper proposes a conceptual architecture to support non-repudiation, 
authenticity, integrity and proof of agreement throughout the e-contracting life-cycle. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 defines the stages of an e-contracting 
process. Section 3.1 describes the e-contracting security goals. Section 3.2 describes 
security services essential for e-contracting. Section 3.3 provides the results of our 
survey on AEC collaborative platforms used for e-contracting. Section 4 proposes an 
architecture for the support of e-contracting life cycle which is discussed and 
informally analysed in section 4.4 of the paper. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. E-contracting Basics 
An electronic contract (e-contract) is an agreement created and signed in electronic form 
without using any paper or other hard copies [29]. It is a contractual agreement, represented 
as digital information and signed with the electronic or digital signatures of the participating 
parties [7]. 
The literature on the security of e-contracting concentrates on the process of e-contract 
formation. Some of the different methods that may be used to execute e-contracting include: 
• Exchange of text documents using electronic communications such as email where a 
party which issues the contract, writes the contract on his/her computer and emails it to 
the second party by typing the name and the second party emails it back to the first 
party with the name indicating the acceptance of the contract. A name typed in the 
email is considered as an electronic signature [15]. While electronic signatures 
describe signatures incorporated in a document by cryptographic or non-cryptographic 
means, digital signatures specifically describe signatures based on cryptographic 
techniques. 
• The text documents that form the basis of an e-contract may be written in XML, a 
mark-up language for documents containing structured information [32]. Structured 
information contains both content and some indication of what role that content plays. 
One advantage of forming contracts using XML is that contracts can be processed 
using machines and contracts can be imported into contract management and 
negotiation tools and achieving better specifications of the contract using industry 
specific XML vocabularies. 
• An e-contract may be in the form of a “click to agree” contract. The terms and 
conditions of the contract are displayed on one party's website and the other party 
agrees to the contract by clicking an “I agree” button on the website accepting the 
relevant terms and conditions. 
• Conceptual system architectures support either part of or the complete e-contracting 
life cycle process. For example, the multiple signing using digital signatures and 
dynamic update conceptual architectures described by Angelov et al [2] to manage the 
e-contract updates. 
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Generally, when contracting parties decide upon a particular method to execute e-contract 
life-cycle, their decision is influenced by the nature and importance of the relevant e-contract. 
For e-contracts of strategic importance or of high economic value, parties may wish to utilize 
appropriate mechanisms to achieve the security of relevant documentation. 
An e-contracting process or life cycle consists of a number of phases where each phase 
constitutes activities confined to that phase. At a broad level, we classify e-contracting 
processes into three phases: 
E-contract formation. The following steps take place during the formation of e-contracts. 
1. Information. General contract preparations are made, information for a request or 
offer of services is provided and contracting parties are identified. 
2. Pre-contract. Preparatory contracting process is performed where several contract 
negotiations are administered and managed. 
3. Contract Negotiation. Contract negotiations are performed, preliminary agreements 
are made regulating the steps on the proceedings of negotiations and a draft 
agreement serving as an example of the final contract is established. 
4. Enactment. The contract is finalised and work can commence or goods shipped. The 
enactment process is executed with signatures of all the participating parties. 
E-contract management. Contracting parties may have to apply changes to the e-
contracts signed in the enactment phase [2]. The e-contracting management system 
incorporates any variations (updates) of the e-contracts formed among the contracting parties. 
E-contract archiving. The finalised e-contracts along with other related contractual 
communications among the business parties are archived for future evidential purposes. 
 
3 Security in E-Contracting 
In this section the security goals that should be achieved for secure e-contracting are 
proposed. We then describe the general security and cryptographic mechanisms that can 
provide these goals. The use of these security mechanisms is reviewed in web-based AEC 
collaborative platforms. 
 
3.1 E-contracting Security Goals 
Any system used to perform the e-contracting process must ensure that the whole process 
is secure. The security requirements specifically for the e-contracting process have not been 
closely examined in the literature to date though the security requirements of other business 
processes such as e-commerce and e-business have been explored [21, 27]. The identified 
security requirements have been determined based on standard e-commerce security 
requirements, a survey of existing AEC collaborative platforms and interviews with 
contracting staff in the AEC industry. 
The security goals of an e-contracting system are outlined below: 
Confidentiality ensures protection of e-contracts and other communications from 
unauthorized disclosure in the e-contracting system. The contracting parties may not want to 
disclose the documents in every stage of the e-contracting life cycle to unauthorized parties. 
This condition depends on the agreement undertaken among the contracting parties before the 
start of the e-contracting process and on the type of business undertaken by the parties. 
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Integrity ensures that contractual documents exchanged among the contracting parties or 
stored in the e-contracting system at any point of time are not duplicated, modified or deleted. 
The contracting parties aim for secure storage or transmission of all the contracting 
documents and messages in every stage of the e-contracting life cycle. 
Authenticity ensures that the parties involved in e-contracting are exactly who they claim 
to be. The contracting partners must authenticate themselves to the e-contracting system and 
their credentials need to be recorded and maintained throughout the period of e-contracting. 
Non-repudiation ensures that contracting parties are prevented from denying having 
performed actions such as denying an established contract and denial of sending or receiving 
any messages. 
Availability ensures that e-contracting systems and contractual data are available to the 
authorized personnel during the period of contract life cycle. 
Proof of agreement ensures every action of the contracting parties in the e-contracting 
system throughout the period of its usage is considered as a proof to which they have agreed. 
Proof of existence assures the existence of contractual documents in the e-contracting 
system or documents communicated via the Internet at a point of time. 
 
3.2 Security Services of E-contracting Systems 
An e-contracting system should incorporate mechanisms to ensure that contractual 
evidence is securely gathered and stored in the case of disputes among the contracting parties. 
These mechanisms are the security services that provide the security goals defined in Section 
3.1. 
3.2.1 Secure Access Control: To alleviate concerns about the security of e-contracts and 
the messages communicated, e-contracting systems must be designed so that users have 
limited access to the e-contracts, depending on their role within the enterprise or business. For 
example, in a collaborative platform used for e-contracting only a sub-contractor may be 
allowed to access drawings and communications relating to a particular project while other 
project information is shared with other parties involved with the enterprise [5]. 
The rights to access, view, modify or delete contractual data in an e-contracting system are 
controlled by an access control system which the e-contracting system supports. The 
components of an access control system are: 
User-authentication. User authentication to the e-contracting system is a process of 
verifying the identity of the user to the system where the user confirms to the system who he 
or she is. E-contracting systems with only password based authentication provide sufficient 
level of security. 
Authorization. Authorization refers to the permissions or rights of the user to read, write 
(for example, add, create, delete or rename the e-contract files in the system) and execute 
contractual data in the e-contracting system. A security policy determines who will have 
access to different types of contractual information and whether or not they have a right to 
alter the data. The method by which the security policy is implemented is referred to as a 
security model [17]. 
3.2.2 Secure Communication: The collaborating parties need to address the effect of the 
risk involved in the exchange of e-contracts on their confidentiality and integrity in 
transmission. If the information and communications technology (ICT) used for 
communications in the e-contracting process is secure, the e-contracting process itself is 
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partially secured. This is also the case for most e-commerce applications. The personnel who 
use e-contracting systems need to make sure that these systems use secure Internet protocols 
such as secure sockets layer (SSL) [16] or Transport Layer Security (TLS) [12] to provide 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity to the data in transmission. 
 
3.2.3 Secure Recording and Archiving: Upon the completion of e-contracting, all the 
contractual documents processed in different stages of the e-contracting life cycle need to be 
archived for future evidential purposes. Secure archiving of contractual information requires 
durability of the storage media and readability of contractual documents. Generally, 
contracting parties will not be found to have satisfied their obligation to preserve contractual 
documents if the mechanism on which they are stored has broken down or if the documents 
are saved in a format that is no longer able to be read by contemporary computer systems. E-
contracting systems need to be updated regularly so that the contracting parties do not have to 
be concerned with the continued readability and availability of the documents [33]. The 
parties should agree contractually before contracting, how the contracting data will be 
archived and what data will remain available to each project participant [5]. 
The main mechanisms for a secure archiving service are as follows: 
Digital Signatures and Hash Functions. Digital signatures [26] based on the combination 
of public key cryptography (PKC) and cryptographic hash functions ensure data origin 
authentication, integrity of the signed contract, non-repudiation and proof of agreement. 
Digital signatures do not bind contracts to a particular time of origin. Usage of secure hash 
functions such as SHA-256 [1] and the secure use of PKC ensure secure digital signatures. 
The security properties of hash functions are outlined below: 
• Collision resistance [24]: For a hash function H, it should be hard to find two messages 
M1 and M2 such that M1 ≠ M2 and H(M1) = H(M2). 
• Preimage resistance [24]: Given the hash value Y = H(M) for a hash function H, it 
must be hard to find M. 
• 2nd-preimage resistance [24]: Given a message M1, it must be hard to find another 
message M2 such that M2 ≠ M1 and H(M1) = H(M2). 
Logging and Auditing. For evidential reasons, often specific tasks need to be recorded. 
System event logs can be used to provide proof of existence of documents and events such as 
the application of a digital signature to a contract document. Although admissible as 
evidence, system logs do depend on the trustworthiness of the system which records the 
event. A trusted third party such as a time-stamping authority may be more reliable source of 
evidence. 
Digital Time-stamping. Time-stamping of digital signatures by a time-stamping authority 
(TSA) on contractual documents and archived documents provides proof of existence of those 
documents at a given point of time [28]. As it is assumed that the TSA is an impartial fair 
third party, it can later be undoubtedly demonstrated that digital signatures on the contract 
have been valid at the time of time-stamping. The accuracy of a time stamp depends on the 
accuracy of the timeserver that allows the TSA to synchronise its system clock over the 
Internet. The time information provided by the timeserver to a TSA is directly traceable to the 
Universal Time Code. Accuracies, for example, of 1-50 milliseconds can be achieved using 
Network Time Protocol (NTP version 3) depending on the characteristics of the 
synchronization source [25]. The security properties expected from the time stamp issued by a 
TSA are outlined below: 
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• It must be infeasible for a time stamping authority to time stamp a document with 
a date and time that is different from the correct one. 
• It must be infeasible to change even a single bit of a time stamped document 
without the change being apparent. 
• Relative temporal authentication [6, 19, 18] intuitively combines message 
authentication with the notion of timeliness of messages. The TSA is said to 
provide this property if one is able to decide which stamp has been issued first for 
each pair of time stamp. This is achieved by applying a collision resistant hash 
function to the earlier stamps which is then incorporated in the later time stamp. 
• The TSA must be reliable and available when needed [3]. 
 
3.3 E-contracting in Collaborative Platforms 
Web-based AEC collaborative platforms designed for project collaboration among 
companies can be used as the basis to conduct e-contracting. The on-line collaboration 
platforms given in Table 1 have been reviewed based on the vendor claims and the review of 
the content in the documentation available in their websites. In the Table 1, “Y” stands for 
Yes, “T” for Transmission and “?” for Unknown. 
Table 1. Security Services of Reviewed Collaborative Platforms 
Platform A
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Aconex [4] Y Y Y T Y 
Citadon CW [8,9] Y Y T Y Y 
Contructware [10] Y Y T T Y 
TeamBinder[14] Y Y T T ? 
ECM [11] Y Y ? ? Y 
E-Builder [13] Y Y ? ? Y 
Evoco [32] Y Y ? ? Y 
Information Channel [31] Y Y ? ? Y 
 
Many of these platforms achieve the security goals required for e-contracting without the 
need of all the security mechanisms described in section 3.2. Secure e-contracting can be 
facilitated by providing user authentication and access control to achieve document integrity 
and confidentiality and logging and audit mechanisms to achieve non-repudiation, proof of 
agreement and proof of existence. The results in Table 1 highlights that all of the reviewed 
construction collaboration platforms provide user authentication through a username and 
password mechanism. Every platform provides role-based access control to restrict the 
availability of documents to only the authorised personnel. Most of the reviewed applications 
CollECTeR 2007, 9-11 December, Melbourne Australia 
 
log user actions and have a file version control mechanism where a new file version is created 
for every update to a contract document. 
Many platforms provide document integrity and confidentiality during the transmission 
and uploading of the documents. Very few of the applications provide document integrity and 
confidentiality after a project has finished. We address this issue by proposing a new e-
contracting architecture. 
 
4 An E-contracting Architecture 
We propose a two-party e-contracting system architecture which uses cryptographic tools 
to ensure that the security goals defined in section 3.1 are achieved for e-contracting 
documents during contract formation, management and archiving. It is assumed that all 
messages are transmitted over a channel secured by TLS or similar mechanism which 
provides confidentiality between the two parties. The main emphasis of the security is on 
providing integrity, authenticity and proof of agreement. 
This architecture consists of three individual systems meant for e-contract formation, e-
contract management and e-contract archiving. These systems are summarised in Figure 1 
assuming the participation of two contracting parties A and B. 
 
4.1 E-contract Formation 
There are many methods for contract formation. To ensure authenticity and non-
repudiation, this system uses digital signatures to form the electronic contract. 
1. While enacting an e-contract M0, party A computes the hash value H(M0) of M0 using 
the cryptographic hash function H and signs the hash value H(M0) using his/her private 
key KApriv and the signature is SigKApriv (H(M0)). Party A sends the message M0 and its 
signature SigKApriv (H(M0)) to B. 
 
Figure 1. An E-contracting Architecture for Contract Formation, 
Management, and Archiving 
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2. Party B first verifies the signature of A using the public key KApub of A ensuring that A 
has signed the message M and its integrity has been maintained. Then B signs the 
signature of A using his/her private key KBpriv. The party B then sends the signature 
SigKBpriv (SigKApriv (H(M0))) to A. 
3. A verifies the signature SigKBpriv (SigKApriv (H(M0))) using the public key KBpub of B. 
During the execution of all the above steps, both parties A and B store the messages, 
their hash values and signatures. 
 
4.2 E-contract Management 
This system manages variations to the e-contract. The following steps take place during 
contract variation. 
1. The party, for example A, which wants to update the contractual document M0 enacted 
in the previous stage, updates it to M1. 
2. Then A signs M1 by concatenating the updated contractual document M1 to the digest 
H(M0) of the previous contractual document M0. This compound document is 
represented as (H(M0),M1) where , represents the concatenation operation. 
3. The party A then computes the digest H(H(M0),M1) of the compound document 
(H(M0),M1). 
4.  The party A then signs the digest H(H(M0),M1) using its private key KApriv and sends 
the signature SigKApriv (H(H(M0),M1)) and the updated contract M1 to B. 
5. The party B then verifies the signature on M1 and if needed updates M1 to M2 and signs 
H(H(H(M0),M1),M2). 
6. The party B then sends M2 along with the signature SigKBpriv (H(H(H(M0),M1),M2)) to A 
who verifies this signature. 
7. Party A again updates the document M2 if needed and this process of updating 
continues until both the parties A and B agree on the final contractual document Mn as 
shown in Fig 1. 
8. Both parties sign on the final contract Mn by linking it to the previously established 
hash chain H(…H(H(H(M0),M1),M2),…,Mn-1). The final digest formed with the hash 
chain is: 
H(…H(H(H(H(M0),M1),M2),…,Mn-1),Mn) 
Assuming that it is computed by the party A, the final signature is: 
SigKApriv (SigKBpriv (H(…H(H(H(H(M0),M1),M2),…,Mn-1),Mn))) 
 
4.3 E-contract Archiving 
This system prepares the contract documents for long term storage and aims to ensure a 
chain of custody using the hash chain and signature mechanisms. Both parties securely 
archive all the contractual documents M0,M1,…,Mn, their digests and all signatures. The 
signatures of both the parties on the final hash chain are time stamped. In general, it is not 
necessary to time stamp all the contractual documents processed in the e-contracting life 
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cycle as the time of updating is recorded in a local log in the system. We assume that the TSA 
used for this purpose is a trusted third party authority. 
The following protocol is used to time stamp the final signature. 
1. Both parties A and B submit their final signature SigKApriv 
(SigKBpriv(H(…H(H(H(H(M0),M1),M2),…,Mn-1),Mn))) on the hash chain to the TSA. 
2. This signature on the final hash chain is verified by the TSA using the respective 
public keys KApub and KBpub of A and B. 
3. The TSA time stamps the signature Final Signature = SigKApriv (SigKApub 
(H(…H(H(H(H(M0),M1),M2),…,Mn-1),Mn))) by attaching the date and time to the 
signature and signing the compound document with its private key K-TSApriv. Let this 
time stamp be SigK-TSApriv (Final Signature||time||date). 
4. The TSA then sends the time stamp to both the clients who verify the time stamp using 
the public key K-TSApub of the TSA. 
The TSA signing process must be repeated at regular time intervals specified in the 
contract agreement. This process is conducted using the latest hash functions and signatures 
to ensure that the long term integrity of the documents is achieved. This process is necessary 
as it is assumed that contract documents can be stored for several years and that new stronger 
algorithms will be developed that will supersede current algorithms. Older signatures and 
hash chains will need to be encapsulated with the contract documents and retained as proof 
that documents have not been altered when the signatures are renewed.  
This architecture can be easily extended to the case of e-contracting for more than two 
parties. In this case, contracts are signed by all the parties one after the other during the e-
contract formation step. Assuming the existence of three participants A, B and C, the contract 
signed by A is verified and signed by B which is then verified and signed by C. Finally C 
sends the signed contract to both A and B who verify the contract. Similarly, the e-contract 
update management system can be designed for multi-party scenario. We consider the further 
design issues and analysis of this e-contracting architecture for multi party scenario as part of 
the future work. 
 
4.4 Analysis of the proposed E-contracting Architecture 
The implementation of public key infrastructure (PKI) and secure cryptographic hash 
functions to sign the contractual documents and the messages communicated across the 
Internet in the above e-contracting system architecture provides non-repudiation, authenticity, 
integrity and proof of agreement security goals. The e-contracting system uses a hash chain 
formed by the recursive application of a cryptographic hash function H. The security of the 
signatures and the time stamps depend on the security of the cryptographic hash function. It is 
assumed that the hash function used possesses all the fundamental security properties. 
The usage of a hash chain records the audit logs of all the contract updates and the 
signatures. All contract updates starting from the initial formation of the contract till the final 
update are linked with each other using the hash chain. This ensures that if either of the party 
tries to change any document, then this change would reflect in all the following contract 
updates. The main attack scenario during contract management or archiving occurs if any 
party changes the contract update M1 to M’1 then this change is reflected in all the subsequent 
hash values in the hash chain. If that party tries to prove that the correct update is M’1 but not 
M1 after the contract has been established then the party has to make sure that the digest of the 
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final hash chain is the same as the original one on which both parties have signed before. This 
is hard for any party as it requires violation of the 2nd-preimage resistance property of the 
hash function used to form the hash chain and it is hard to violate this property for a secure 
hash function. In addition, the use of the hash chain and the time stamping of the finalised e-
contract by a trusted TSA prevents fraudulent attempts by either of the parties on the other 
party such as not returning the e-contract update with its own signature by claiming falsely 
that it did send the signed e-contract. 
Our contract management system does not explicitly include the request and agreement for 
change protocols between the parties as the multiple signing and dynamic update approaches 
of [2] to manage contract updates. In our architecture, these protocols are implicitly handled 
by the hash chain. In addition, there is no need to have a separate e-notary to act as a trusted 
third party to sign every contract update due to the use of the hash chain and the trusted TSA 
to time stamp the final hash chain. The absence of e-notary to sign every contract update 
ensures that our contract update protocol does not impose as much computational and 
communications burden on the contract management system as the schemes in [2]. In our 
architecture, every update requires the generation of two signatures and the verification of one 
signature. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have identified seven security goals for e-contracts and the mechanisms 
of an e-contracting system to achieve those security requirements. We have analysed the 
security of AEC collaborative platforms and their potential to be used for e-contracting. A 
new architecture for secure e-contracting which can be incorporated into existing AEC 
collaborative platforms is proposed. This new architecture is able to provide all the security 
requirements identified. 
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